AEMS security model¶
Applies to AEMS 1.0.8.0
This documentation describes AEMS 1.0.8.0 (service 0.1.9.0, driver 1.0.8.0, Allow-list Tool 1.3.0.0), released 2026-11-20. Install 1.0.8.0. Text marked "from 1.0.8.0" does not apply to earlier versions. Where the text says "from 1.0.6.0", it applies to 1.0.7.0 and 1.0.8.0 as well.
This page describes what AEMS trusts, how it decides whether a launch is elevated, what protects its configuration and license, and where the design stops. Read it before a production rollout.
Trust anchors¶
| Part | Protection |
|---|---|
| AEMS kernel driver | Signed by Microsoft. Its device \\.\AEMS can be opened by SYSTEM only. In addition the driver accepts a caller only when its image path ends in \Program Files\AEMS\AEMSvc.exe; this is a path check, not a signature check. |
AEMSvc service |
Runs as LocalSystem. Signed by Logic Unknown ApS (the code-signing certificate subject reads "Logic Unknown Aps"). |
| Configuration | Registry values under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Logic Unknown\AEMS, or under the policy hive HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Logic Unknown\AEMS, which wins when present. |
| Audit | Windows Application event log, source AEMS. No network or cloud dependency. |
| Decisions | Made on the device only, from the allow-list in the registry. AEMS has no portal, no cloud service and no online dependency: it never contacts a server, and license keys are checked offline on the device. Signature checks use only the revocation information already cached on the device; AEMS does not fetch it from the network. |
How a launch is decided¶
The driver catches a launch of an allow-listed path; AEMSvc decides from the token of the process that was actually launched:
| How the allow-listed app was started | What AEMS does |
|---|---|
| "Run as administrator" (any admin account), by an administrator with UAC off, or by SYSTEM | Nothing. The process already runs elevated; the driver does not catch it. |
"Run as different user" / runas with a local administrator account |
Relaunched with that account's real full token, child governance off. |
| By the console user (standard user) | AEMS-built elevated token, default-deny child governance, HashSHA enforced. From 1.0.7.0, for a user whose logon has a split token, the token is built from the user's full token (see Users with a split token). |
| "Run as different user" with another standard account, or from a non-interactive session | Left running unelevated with its own token (event 2004). AEMS never elevates an identity it cannot vouch for. |
From 1.0.8.0 the driver holds a caught launch until AEMS has suspended it, so the original does
not run while AEMS decides: it stays suspended, with the launching user's own token, and is then
either ended and replaced by the elevated relaunch or resumed unchanged (see
Programs that finish very quickly for the cases in which it is
not held and runs as in 1.0.7.0). If AEMSvc is stopped, nothing is held and top-level launches
run unelevated. If AEMSvc ends unexpectedly while a launch is suspended, the driver ends that
process (within about 10 seconds); start it again. Child processes of a governed (elevated)
application do not start while the service is stopped. With AdminPassthrough=0, administrators are
treated exactly like standard users.
When the original is ended, the un-elevated programs it had already started in that short time
are ended too (one snapshot; same session and user, in its process chain, created after their
parent and the original, up to 8 levels and 64 processes; event 1224, or warning 2232 when not
all could be ended). A program that already did its work in that time, was started after the
snapshot, or broke away from the original's process chain, is not undone; when the original had
already exited before the decision (event 1010), nothing is ended. EndOriginalDescendants = 0
turns this off (event 1225): such programs then run twice, as in 1.0.5.0.
Every exact-path entry on a local fixed disk whose program or folder standard users can change is listed once per service start in warning 2233: such an entry is elevated, but any user can replace its program.
The elevated token¶
For a standard user AEMS builds the elevated token itself (top-level relaunch and elevated child relaunch). From AEMS 1.0.6.0 this token has:
- Owner
BUILTIN\Administrators, as the token of an administrator elevated through UAC. Up to 1.0.5.0 the owner was the standard user. - Default permissions (used for an object that is created without explicit permissions and inherits none from its parent): Administrators full control, SYSTEM full control, the user's logon session read and execute. Up to 1.0.5.0 they were the user's own (the user full control).
What follows from it:
- Files, folders and registry keys that an elevated program creates in protected places
(
C:\Program Files,HKLM\SOFTWARE) are owned by Administrators. The standard user has no owner rights over them and only the access the parent folder or key grants (inC:\Program Files: read and execute), so after an elevated installation the user cannot change or replace the installed files. Up to 1.0.5.0 the user owned them and could change their permissions and contents. - Where a folder gives users write access only through
CREATOR OWNER(for example subfolders ofC:\ProgramData, or folders created directly underC:\), files that an elevated program creates there are no longer writable by the user, also not by the user's non-elevated programs, including the non-elevated child processes of the same elevated application. If an application writes data there elevated and later changes it unelevated, grant the Users group the needed rights on that folder explicitly. - Files that an elevated program saves in the user's profile (Documents, AppData,
%TEMP%) are owned by Administrators, but the user keeps full access through the profile's inherited permissions. - Objects that inherit no permissions, such as the elevated process itself: the user's
non-elevated programs in the same logon session get read and execute access only; the same
user in another logon session (a scheduled task with stored credentials,
runas, a remote session) gets no access. This is the same as for an administrator elevated through UAC. - Objects created by earlier versions keep their owner. Files, folders and keys that elevated programs created under AEMS 1.0.5.0 or earlier stay owned by the standard user; the update does not change them, and their contents may have been changed by the user. Reinstall the affected applications after the update (uninstall, delete the remaining folder, install again). To find such objects, list the owners, for example (read-only):
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files','C:\Program Files (x86)','C:\ProgramData' -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $o = (Get-Acl -LiteralPath $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Owner
$o -and $o -notmatch 'SYSTEM$|\\Administrators$|\\TrustedInstaller$' } |
Select-Object FullName, @{n='Owner';e={(Get-Acl -LiteralPath $_.FullName).Owner}}
- Administrator passthrough is unchanged. An administrator's launch uses the administrator's real Windows token, as before.
Environment of elevated programs¶
From AEMS 1.0.6.0 a program that AEMS elevates for a standard user (top-level and elevated child relaunch) gets:
- the machine environment (
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environmentand the values Windows computes). A reference to another machine variable that Windows left unexpanded (for example%ProgramFiles%inPSModulePath) is expanded;PATHandPSModulePathkeep only absolute folders (drive or network paths), any relative or unresolvable element is left out; - profile variables that AEMS computes for the user:
USERPROFILE(the profile folder Windows has registered),HOMEDRIVE,HOMEPATH,APPDATA(<profile>\AppData\Roaming),LOCALAPPDATA(<profile>\AppData\Local),TEMPandTMP(<profile>\AppData\Local\Temp),USERNAMEandUSERDOMAIN(the names of the user's logon session, for local, domain and Microsoft Entra ID accounts alike),LOGONSERVER,USERDNSDOMAINandSESSIONNAME; - nothing from the user's
HKCU\EnvironmentorHKCU\Volatile Environment.
Reason: a standard user can write HKCU\Environment. Variables such as COR_PROFILER,
DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS, JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS, NODE_OPTIONS or PATH would otherwise make an
allow-listed .NET, Java, Electron or similar program load the user's code with administrator
rights. If this environment cannot be built (no profile folder, the account name cannot be
determined), the program is not elevated (error 3009; a top-level program keeps running
unelevated, 2004).
Unchanged: a program that AEMS relaunches non-elevated (a child of a governed application) keeps the user's own environment. The administrator passthrough keeps the administrator's own environment, exactly as a UAC elevation of that administrator does. With UAC turned off, the session token of an administrator is itself elevated, so a child process that AEMS relaunches non-elevated for that administrator (a child of a governed application) gets the machine environment described above instead of the administrator's own (the safe choice).
Compatibility effects¶
- Per-user
PATHentries are not used. Programs installed per user are not found by name by elevated programs: the%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsAppsaliases (such aswingetand Store Python), the per-user setup of Visual Studio Code, per-user Python, npm global tools, .NET tools and user-scope Git. - Every other
HKCU\Environmentvalue is dropped: proxy variables (HTTP_PROXY,HTTPS_PROXY,NO_PROXY,ALL_PROXY),JAVA_HOME,GOPATH, per-userPSModulePathadditions, vendor and licensing variables. Set a variable that an elevated program needs machine-wide (System Properties > Environment Variables > System variables, or Group Policy / Intune), then restart the program. OneDrive,OneDriveCommercial,OneDriveConsumer,HOMESHARE,CLIENTNAMEandUSERDOMAIN_ROAMINGPROFILEare not set.HOMEDRIVE/HOMEPATHalways point to the local profile: an Active Directory home drive (for exampleH:) is not reflected in the variables. The mapped drive itself is not visible to elevated programs either (see Drive letters of elevated programs).APPDATA/LOCALAPPDATAalways use the local default layout: AppData that is redirected by folder redirection is not reflected.- A
TEMP/TMPthat the user moved is ignored. - A machine variable that refers to
%USERPROFILE%or%TEMP%points to the Default profile orC:\Windows\TEMP(Windows expands such references without a user).
Limits¶
-
A program that finishes very quickly runs once, elevated, from 1.0.8.0. While an old driver is still loaded after a completed upgrade (not expected; warning 2236) and after a hold timeout it can still run twice, once without administrator rights and once elevated (see What cannot be closed, item 11).
-
%TEMP%and the profile stay writable by the user. The environment change removes values the user chose; it does not make the user's folders trustworthy. An installer or self-extractor that unpacks to%TEMP%and runs or loads files from there can still be given planted or replaced files, and programs still load content from the profile by themselves (for example PowerShell profile scripts and the user module folderDocuments\WindowsPowerShell\Modules, which Windows PowerShell adds itself, and application settings under AppData). - A file staged in
%TEMP%and then moved into place stays writable by the user. A move within one drive keeps the file's permissions, so a file that an installer creates in the user's%TEMP%and then moves intoC:\Program Filesis owned by Administrators but keeps the user's full-control entry. Only files created in place are protected. - Machine
PATHfolders that standard users can write are the search path of every elevated program. Make sure no folder in the machinePATHis writable by Users (installers sometimes add such folders, for exampleC:\Python310\). - The signed-in user can still end an elevated program. An elevated program runs in the user's own logon session and on the user's desktop, so the signed-in user can still close or end an elevated program they started. This is by design.
- Programs that sandbox their own helper processes are not supported as elevated
applications in AEMS 1.0.6.0: Chromium-based browsers, Electron applications and
applications that host WebView2. Such a program starts its helper processes (renderer, GPU,
utility) with a deliberately reduced, sandboxed token. AEMS governs these helpers like any
other child process: each is blocked when it is created and started again by AEMS outside the
sandbox the program asked for (non-elevated, or elevated under
AllowChildElevation=1). Such a program may therefore not work when elevated, and a helper meant to handle untrusted content does not run in its sandbox. With "Children in place" the sandboxed helpers are refused instead: the program starts, its helpers do not (blank windows or an exit). Do not allow-list such programs.
Default-deny rules¶
- AEMS elevates only the applications you allow-list.
- Prefix matching. A
DataPathwithout wildcards is matched as a prefix of the launched path. Always write the full path including the file name; a folder path approves every program below it. - Child processes are not elevated by default. With
AllowChildElevation=1an app's direct children are relaunched elevated; elevation continues down a chain only where every link is opted in. WithChildInPlaceas well, children start elevated in place (see Children in place). Opt in only specific, trusted parent apps. Opting in a general shell or interpreter (cmd.exe,powershell.exe,pwsh.exe,wscript.exe,python.exe, ...) is allowed, but it makes the user an administrator while it runs: such a parent elevates every child it spawns, with no per-child allow-list or hash gate, and with "Whole tree" everything the user types in it. WithoutChildInPlacethe guards below decide only in part for such a child: a child whose file fails its own entry's hash, or whose entry is malformed or an inactive wildcard rule, is not started at all; aPublisher, thumbprint or trusted-location failure does not stop it - the parent'sAllowChildElevation=1still elevates it. - Programs started by a console host are never elevated. When an elevated application
starts the console host process with a program to run (for example
conhost.exe <program>orconhost.exe --headless <tool>), the program that the console host starts runs non-elevated, whatever the application'sAllowChildElevationsetting. Commands typed in the console window of an elevated, allow-listed console program such ascmd.exeare children of that program, not of the console host: they follow that entry'sAllowChildElevationas before (elevated with1, non-elevated otherwise). Elevated console programs themselves work as before. - Arguments are locked by default. A standard user's elevated relaunch is
"<DataPath>" <Arguments>;AllowUserArguments=1forwards the user's own command line. Never set it on a host that executes what its arguments name (cmd.exe,powershell.exe,mmc.exe,rundll32.exe,regedit.exe, script hosts). - Pins.
HashSHAis enforced for standard users (for administrators it is informational). From 1.0.6.0PublisherandPublisherThumbprintare enforced on any entry that sets them. An entry with a malformedHashSHAorPublisherThumbprintis kept in its place as a refusing entry (warning 2012), so a later, broader entry cannot elevate the same file without the pin. - Fail closed. When the driver catches a launch but AEMS finds no matching entry, a standard user's program is not elevated (warning 2003).
- Administrators. A failed check does not block an administrator: AEMS relaunches the app with the administrator's own real token and logs warning 2016. With the default UAC setting an administrator gets nothing they could not already get by accepting a UAC prompt; a standard user cannot opt in.
Children in place¶
With ChildInPlace on an entry that also has AllowChildElevation=1, the programs that the
elevated application starts are checked while Windows creates them and, when they pass, start
elevated as real children (see Children in place on the
Configure page). This section states what that changes for security.
What gets stronger¶
- A child starts only from a folder that standard users cannot change, on a local fixed
drive, with the same user and the same elevated token as its parent. Without
ChildInPlacea direct child of anAllowChildElevation=1parent is relaunched elevated from wherever it lies. - The decision is bound to the file that actually runs. The driver reports the path and the volume of the file Windows is about to start, not the name the parent used, and AEMS judges exactly that file. A child started through an alias drive letter, a symbolic link or a junction, or from a network or removable drive, is refused, so the user cannot point the start at a different file.
- No copies. Inside an in-place tree every child is either started in place or refused, at every depth. Nothing is relaunched as a separate elevated copy.
- Locked arguments stay locked. A child whose own entry locks its arguments starts only with exactly those arguments.
- Machine drive letters for the whole elevated tree. The elevated application, every child started in place and the console host of each elevated console program use the machine's drive letters, not the user's own (see Drive letters of elevated programs).
What changes, and what you accept with it¶
- The command line, working directory, environment, inherited handles and console of a child started in place are chosen by its parent, not by AEMS.
- A
PublisherorPublisherThumbprintpin on a child's own entry is not checked for an in-place start; it only ends the chain there. The folder rule is what protects the file. - "Whole tree" spreads elevation to every program below the application, up to 8 levels. Without it, elevation reaches direct children plus chains in which every link is opted in.
- With "Direct children", a grandchild is refused instead of relaunched as a copy, also when it
has a plain
AllowChildElevation=1entry of its own. - Each child waits up to 2 seconds while AEMS checks it. An application with more than 6 child starts waiting at the same moment gets "Access is denied" for the extra ones; they are refused, not queued.
- A user who holds the program file of a child open in a special way (an oplock) can make that child be refused. AEMS fails closed: the child does not start.
- A child started from a network share that does not answer can make the starting application wait until Windows gives up on the share; the child is then refused (by design, not measured).
What cannot be closed (read before you opt in)¶
- A program that can start other programs makes the user an administrator while it runs.
This is true for PowerShell,
cmd.exe, a terminal, a script host, and anything with an Open dialog or plugins. An elevated shell with "Whole tree" elevates whatever the user types. The same was already true forAllowChildElevation=1. - A child with an Open or Save dialog can change any file as administrator without starting a process.
- The parent chooses the arguments, working directory and environment of a child started in place.
- A helper started from the user's
%TEMP%or any other folder a standard user can change is refused and no copy starts (documented limit, from 1.0.6.0). Libraries (DLLs) and data files that a child started in place loads from the user's%TEMP%are not checked at all: loading a file does not start a process. - Processes that Windows components start on the program's behalf are outside the elevated
tree and outside all AEMS control, some of them with the user's elevated token: the Windows
Installer custom-action server that runs an MSI's impersonated custom actions, scheduled
tasks, COM servers that the elevated program activates, processes created through WMI
(
Win32_Process.Create), and services that start a process for their caller (for example the Secondary Logon service). For an MSI that an in-place program installs, "works" means the installation completes, not that its custom actions are governed. They also keep the user's drive letters. - A thread that impersonates the user still sees the user's own drive letters. The
machine drive letters protect only threads that do not impersonate. A thread of an elevated
program, or of one of its in-place children, that impersonates a token of the user's logon
session (some installers and installer frameworks, RPC or COM servers that impersonate a
client of the same session, programs that call
ImpersonateSelf) resolves drive letters through the user's own mappings, which the user can change. Such a program can be redirected by the user (measured). AEMS's own checks never run impersonated, and the check of which file a child starts does not depend on drive letters. - While the AEMS service is stopped, starting or restarting, elevated console programs keep working, but their console host does not get the machine drive letters (counted in warning 2221). If Windows refuses to apply the machine drive letters at all, no elevated program starts (error 3240, fail closed).
- Children that ask for their own elevation (
requireAdministratorin their manifest) are expected to fail with error 740, as they do with the relaunch (in place: not measured). - Sandboxed helper processes of Chromium, Edge WebView2 and Electron programs are refused, so such a program starts but its helpers do not. Programs on a volume that is not NTFS (ReFS, Dev Drive, FAT, exFAT) are refused in place. Trees deeper than 8 levels are refused.
- A child started through an alias drive letter, a symbolic link or a junction, from a network drive, a UNC path, removable media or a mounted ISO is refused in place. For programs that must start children from such places, leave "Children in place" off: today's block-and-relaunch then applies, with its weaker checks.
- A program that finishes very quickly can run twice in the cases below; otherwise, from
1.0.8.0, it runs once, elevated: the driver holds the start until AEMS has suspended the new
process before its first instruction (at most 1 second; see
Programs that finish very quickly). The hold only delays a
start, it never refuses one, and a suspended process carries only the user's own token, so
nothing in it grants more than the user has without AEMS. If AEMSvc ends unexpectedly while a
process is suspended, the driver ends that process. The cases: if an old driver is still
loaded after a completed upgrade (not expected; warning 2236, restart the device), after a hold
timeout or while
the hold breaker is open
(warning 2235), and when the suspend could not be checked (warning 2235). Then, as in 1.0.7.0,
the user's original start of an
allow-listed program runs without administrator rights for a fraction of a second until
AEMS has started the elevated program. A wrapper that does its whole work in that time has
run once without administrator rights (its work typically fails or is incomplete) and then
once elevated (measured in 10 of 10 quick starts;
EndOriginalDescendantsdoes not change it, because it stops only programs that are still running). This is how allow-listed programs have always been caught, also in 1.0.5.0, and no AEMS setting changes it. A program whose first action changes something before it needs administrator rights is affected; programs that take longer than about half a second to reach their real work, or whose first attempt simply fails without side effects, are not affected in practice.
Users with a split token¶
Windows gives a standard user a split token when the user is a member of a group that User
Account Control filters (for example Network Configuration Operators, Power Users, Backup
Operators, Print Operators, and some domain groups) or holds a privilege that User Account
Control filters. The user's normal programs then run with a filtered token, in which such a
group is "deny only". whoami /groups shows such a group as "Group used for deny only".
From AEMS 1.0.7.0 the elevated token for such a user is built from the user's full token (event 1226). What that means:
- The elevated program runs in the user's full logon session, as a program elevated by User Account Control does. Windows reports it as fully elevated.
- Groups that are "deny only" in the user's normal session are enabled in the elevated program, in addition to Administrators (as before). Locally this gives nothing that the Administrators group of the elevated program does not already give.
- The privileges are the fixed AEMS set, exactly as before; none are taken from the user's token.
- On the network nothing changes: an elevated program always acted with the user's own account, with every right that account has on the network (also the rights of a powerful domain group). Putting a program on the allow-list for such a user does not limit it to local administration.
- Network connections that the user made only in the normal session (for example
net usewith other credentials) are not shared with the elevated program (by design, not measured). Drive letters do not change: elevated programs already use the machine's drive letters (see Drive letters of elevated programs). - If the user's full token cannot be read, the program is not elevated (warning 2234, fail closed); AEMS never falls back to the filtered token.
- An administrator whose logon has a split token, on a device where administrator passthrough
is switched off (
AdminPassthrough=0), is handled the same way: the elevated token is built from the administrator's full token, with the fixed AEMS privileges and child governance. With administrator passthrough on (the default) nothing changes for administrators.
In AEMS 1.0.6.0 the elevated token of such a user was built from the filtered token. Children in
place were then always refused (warning 2224 [PRE_TOKEN]).
Drive letters of elevated programs¶
From AEMS 1.0.6.0 every program that AEMS elevates for a standard user (top-level relaunch,
elevated child relaunch and every child started in place) resolves drive letters through the
machine's drive letters (the global device map), not through the user's own. A standard user
can create drive letters for their own logon session (subst, a mapped network drive, or a
private redirect of an existing letter such as C:). Up to 1.0.5.0 an elevated program followed
such letters, so a user could make it open a different file than intended.
What follows:
- An elevated program does not see the user's own mapped network drives or
substletters. Paths on them are "not found". Drive letters defined for the whole machine stay visible. Measured: the user saw asubstletter; the elevated application, its child started in place and that child's child did not. - This applies to every elevated launch, with or without
ChildInPlace. The administrator passthrough is not affected (it runs with the administrator's own token). - If the machine drive letters cannot be applied to a process, AEMS does not start it (error 3240).
- The limits are in What cannot be closed items 5 to 7: impersonating threads and processes outside the elevated tree keep the user's drive letters.
Protecting the configuration¶
- The policy hive wins over the base hive; a complete
Applicationssubtree there replaces the base allow-list, so a local edit of the base hive cannot weaken a pushed list. TamperProtection=1(opt-in, off by default) makes the driver deny registry changes underHKLM\SOFTWARE\Logic Unknown\AEMSfor every process except AEMSvc. It is tamper evidence against casual edits, not a barrier against a determined local administrator, and it does not cover the policy hive. See the TamperProtection notes.
License keys¶
- A license key is checked offline, on the device, against the signature of Logic Unknown ApS. AEMS never contacts a license server.
- A license key is not bound to a device: whoever has it can use it until it expires. Treat it as confidential.
- Every local user, also a standard user, can read the applied key in the registry
(
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Logic Unknown\AEMS\License, the policy value and a staged request use the defaultHKLM\SOFTWAREaccess rights). Only administrators (withTamperProtection=1, only AEMSvc) can change it. LICENSEKEY=<key>puts the key on the msiexec command line. The MSI log masks it, but process-creation auditing, Sysmon, EDR telemetry and management tools record command lines. For fleets prefer the policy value or a customer MSI;--set-licensereads the key from standard input.- The license string and the e-mail address in it are never written to the event log, and
--license-statusnever prints the key. - Licensing is enforced against standard users; it relies on administrators not tampering with the device (see Upgrade grace).
Residual risks¶
- The driver depends on undocumented Windows kernel structures. It checks them at every start and grants nothing when they do not match (error 3010, no elevation). On a Windows build newer than the validated ones it loads, and elevation depends on that self-check alone; a part of the driver then runs on a kernel that was not tested (see Supported Windows versions).
- Children in place: see What cannot be closed.
- The driver's caller check is a path check, not a signature check; the protection against other callers is that its device can be opened by SYSTEM only.
- An attacker who already has SYSTEM or local administrator rights is out of scope: administrators can stop the driver, change the configuration and uninstall AEMS.
- The trusted-location check of wildcard rules decides by storage bus, not by "internal" or "external": eSATA, Thunderbolt or USB4 (NVMe) enclosures, external SAS and Storage Spaces pools on USB disks are not detected as external (see Wildcard rule limitations). Point wildcard rules at the system drive and restrict external storage with device control.
- Paths without wildcards are prefix matches (see "Default-deny rules").
%TEMP%and the profile of the user stay writable by the user, also for elevated programs; a file staged in%TEMP%and moved into place keeps the user's write access; user-writable folders in the machinePATHreach every elevated program (see Limits).- Objects that elevated programs created under AEMS 1.0.5.0 or earlier stay owned by the standard user (see The elevated token).
- Programs that sandbox their own helper processes (Chromium-based browsers, Electron, WebView2 hosts) are not supported as elevated applications (see Limits).
Scope and limits¶
- AEMS targets a kiosk with one interactive user and elevates into the active console session. Multi-user Remote Desktop Services is out of scope.
- If AEMSvc stops, nothing is elevated until it runs again. If it ends unexpectedly, Windows restarts it after 5 seconds, twice; after a third failure within a day it stays stopped (event 5000) until it is started manually.
- The driver refuses to load on Windows builds below 19045 (Windows 10 22H2). There is no upper build limit; after a feature update to a newer build, elevation works only when the driver's start-up self-check passes (see Supported Windows versions).
- A "Run as different user" administrator window left open on the kiosk desktop lets whoever is at the keyboard start allow-listed apps elevated without a prompt. Sign such windows out after use.
Wildcard rule guards¶
The driver only catches a launch that matches the pattern; AEMSvc decides. Every configured check must pass. A check that fails or cannot be completed counts as failed (fail closed): a standard user's process is released and continues unelevated, and AEMSvc logs warning 2013 with the image, the entry name and the precise reason (for an administrator see 2016 in the outcomes table).
- Trusted location (wildcard rules only):
- the file can be opened without write or delete sharing; a file that is still being copied or that another process holds open for writing is refused (retry when the copy is done), and a launch can be delayed while another process holds the file open;
- the launched path is the file's canonical long path: an 8.3 short path such as
C:\PROGRA~1\...or an alternate data stream is refused (use the long path); - the drive is reported as a fixed drive, and the disk's storage bus is one AEMS accepts: SATA, SAS, SCSI, ATA/ATAPI, NVMe, RAID,
Storage Spaces, SCM or UFS (this includes the virtual disks of Hyper-V, VMware and Azure
virtual machines). Refused: removable media (whatever the bus), and disks on the USB,
FireWire (1394), SD, MMC (eMMC), iSCSI, Fibre Channel, SSA, virtual and file-backed virtual
(mounted VHD/VHDX or ISO) buses, an unknown bus or any other bus not in the accepted list, a volume that cannot be opened or
queried, and network drives and RAM disks that are not reported as fixed drives (code
RemovableVolumeorNotFixedVolume). The check is by bus, not by where the disk sits: disks on an accepted bus that are attached externally (for example a Thunderbolt/USB4 NVMe or eSATA enclosure, external SAS, or a Storage Spaces pool built on USB disks) are not detected as external, so point wildcard rules at the system drive; - the drive letter is a global one: a drive letter created or redirected for one user
(
subst, a mapped drive, a per-user redirect of an existing letter) is refused (codeNotFixedVolume). The reason says which view saw the different drive letter: the "original's logon session" (the user who started the program) or the "logon session of the elevated process"; in both cases use a real local path on a global drive letter; - no component of the path (the file or any folder above it) is a reparse point (junction, symbolic link, mount point);
- the file and every folder up to and including the drive root are owned by SYSTEM, BUILTIN\Administrators or NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller;
- no allow ACE for any other SID grants a modifying right: on the file
FILE_WRITE_DATA,FILE_APPEND_DATA,FILE_WRITE_EA,FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES,DELETE,WRITE_DAC,WRITE_OWNER(or a generic right that maps to one of them); on the file's folderFILE_ADD_FILE,FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY,FILE_DELETE_CHILD,DELETE,WRITE_DAC,WRITE_OWNER; on higher foldersFILE_DELETE_CHILD,DELETE,WRITE_DAC,WRITE_OWNER; on the volume root (C:\,D:\)FILE_DELETE_CHILD,WRITE_DACandWRITE_OWNER(aDELETEright on a volume root is ignored, because a volume root cannot be deleted, so the default root of a data volume such asD:\does not block a rule). (The inherit-only right of Authenticated Users to create subfolders inC:\does not count forC:\itself.) - A folder created directly in the drive root fails. On a default Windows installation
C:\passes Modify for Authenticated Users on to every new folder below it, so a folder such asC:\Contosofails this check even when an administrator or an installer created it. Use a folder underC:\Program Files. If a folder in the drive root is required, remove the inherited entries and grant only administrators full control (see Wildcard path rules for theicaclscommands). - A NULL DACL fails. Deny ACEs are ignored (conservative). Inherit-only ACEs do not count
for the object itself; an effective
CREATOR OWNERorOWNER RIGHTSACE is evaluated like any other SID. - Identity pin: the file carries a valid embedded Authenticode signature whose leaf
certificate CN equals
Publisher(and whose SHA-1 thumbprint equalsPublisherThumbprintwhen set), and/or its SHA-256 equalsHashSHA.Publishercompares the certificate's common name (CN) only, not the issuing authority. Revocation is not checked online, only from the local cache (the launch never waits for the network), so a revoked certificate may still be accepted;PublisherThumbprintorHashSHAis the strict option. An expired certificate with a valid timestamp is valid, as in normal Authenticode.
AEMSvc opens the file once without write or delete sharing, runs the checks while it holds that handle and keeps it open until the elevated relaunch has started, so the file cannot be swapped between the check and the launch.
For a locked wildcard rule the launch line is "<launched file>" <Arguments>: the concrete
file the user started, never the pattern.
Publisher / PublisherThumbprint on an exact-path entry are enforced too (a
renewal-proof alternative to HashSHA); the trusted-location check applies to wildcard rules
only. An exact entry that sets none of the new values behaves exactly as before.
Outcomes:
| Situation | Result |
|---|---|
| Standard user, top-level launch, all checks pass | Elevated; information event 1009 names the rule. |
| Standard user, top-level launch, a check fails | Released unelevated; warning 2013 with the reason. |
| Child of a governed parent, a check fails | Warning 2013, two cases. (a) The file itself does not pass its own entry's identity (HashMismatch, HashFailed, MalformedRule) or the entry is an inactive wildcard rule (WildcardInactive): the child is NOT started at all, whatever the parent's policy. (b) A Publisher, thumbprint or trusted-location failure: the child is handled like a child that is not on the allow-list (its own entry is ignored: no configured Arguments, its own children are not elevated), and the parent decides: unelevated when the parent does not allow child elevation; still elevated, by design, when the parent has AllowChildElevation=1 (the 2013 text says which). |
| Administrator (passthrough), a check fails | Warning 2016 "ADMINISTRATOR OVERRIDE": relaunched elevated with the administrator's own real token, as administrator passthrough always does. A standard user would have been refused (2013). |
| Standard user, the driver caught the launch but AEMSvc finds no matching entry | Warning 2003 "NOT elevated (fail closed)", followed by 2004: the original keeps running unelevated. Check that the driver and AEMSvc come from the same MSI and that DataPath matches the path. |
| Unlicensed | Unchanged: the license check wins before any of this. |
The guards protect top-level launches and a child's own rule. A child whose file fails its own
entry's hash (or whose entry is malformed or an inactive wildcard rule) is not started at all. A
Publisher, thumbprint or location failure does not stop the child of a parent with
AllowChildElevation=1 and no ChildInPlace: such a parent elevates its direct children whatever rule they match, so the warning about AllowChildElevation applies unchanged. A child started in place always gets the folder check (see Children in place).
Wildcard rule limitations¶
- Embedded signatures only. A file that is only catalog-signed (many Windows binaries,
such as
notepad.exe) has no embedded signature and cannot satisfyPublisher; useHashSHAfor such a file. - Storage check by bus. Network shares, removable media, disks on the USB, FireWire
(1394), SD, MMC (eMMC), iSCSI, Fibre Channel, SSA, virtual, file-backed virtual or unknown
buses, a volume that cannot be queried, mounted VHD/VHDX files and drive letters created for one user (
subst, mapped drives) always fail the trusted-location check. Disks on an accepted bus that are attached externally (Thunderbolt/USB4 NVMe or eSATA enclosures, external SAS, Storage Spaces pools on USB disks) are not detected as external; point wildcard rules at the system drive and restrict external storage with device control. - Long paths and closed files only. A launch through an 8.3 short path, or of a file that is open for writing (for example still being copied), is refused.
- No online revocation check. Revocation is read from the local cache only, so a revoked
signing certificate may still be accepted.
PublisherThumbprintorHashSHAis the strict option. Publisheris the common name only. It does not pin the certificate authority; addPublisherThumbprintwhen that matters.- A pin identifies the executable, not its folder.
Publisher,PublisherThumbprintandHashSHAcheck the.exeonly. Programs load libraries (DLLs) from their own folder, so no folder of any elevated entry, wildcard or exact, may be writable by standard users; otherwise a user can plant a library that runs elevated. Wildcard rules enforce this; for exact entries it is the administrator's responsibility. - Launch delay. The launch can be delayed while another process holds the file open.
- Trusted SIDs are fixed to SYSTEM, BUILTIN\Administrators and NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller. A folder that a deployment account or a group such as "Software installers" can write fails the check.
- Elevation on launch, not on arrival. AEMS elevates a matching file when a user launches it. Nothing is started when a file merely appears in the folder.
- Driver and service versions. Wildcard rules need driver 1.0.3.0 or later with protocol
0x00020002or later (AEMS 1.0.6.0 ships driver 1.0.6.0, protocol0x00020003), which runs after the 1.0.6.0 upgrade and the restart that follows it (restart again if 2014 or 3011 shows the old driver is still loaded). With an older driver AEMSvc does not send wildcard rules and logs warning 2014 once at start; exact entries keep working. The wildcard rules are then never elevated, and a launch that a wildcard rule matches first is refused even when a later, broader entry would catch it (2013[WildcardInactive]; administrator 2016; child not started). If 2014 is still logged after the reboot, the installed package does not contain driver 1.0.3.0 or later: install the current AEMS MSI (1.0.8.0) from Logic Unknown ApS. AEMSvc 0.1.4.0 and earlier (AEMS 1.0.5.0 and earlier) ignorePublisherandPublisherThumbprintentirely and treat a pattern as a literal path that never matches.
Folders of elevated programs¶
Publisher, PublisherThumbprint and HashSHA identify the
executable only. Programs load libraries (DLLs) from their own folder, so the folder of every
elevated entry, wildcard or exact, must not be writable by standard users; otherwise a user can
place a library there that then runs elevated. Wildcard rules check this; for exact entries it
is your responsibility (install allow-listed programs under C:\Program Files).
Report a security issue¶
Report a security issue to Logic Unknown ApS through the contact page (mark the message as a security report).